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BOOK REVIEWS
THaE DESIGN OF DEMOCRACY. By George Washington Goble.
University of Okldhoma Press. 1946. Pp. 234.

Norman:

Shocked by what he witnessed during a tour of Germany and Italy,
shortly before the outbreak of World War II, Professor Goble, of the University of Illinois,'departed from his special fields of contracts and insurance
law to ask himself some broader questions: "Is there still danger that this
philosophy of hatred, intolerance, oppression, and brutality will spread to
our own country?" Knowing in a general way the "safeguards against such
a social order" in America, he nevertheless found not too satisfying or reassuring the answers to his own questions that came immediately to mind.
He determined to engage upon a more penetrating analysis. The result is
his book, which is worth much more than the relatively short time required
to read it. "
Conceding at the outset that before and during the late World War,
democracy was losing out in many countries and further that "much that
has been included in the definition of democracy may not merit retention,"
the-author undertakes to point out those elements which have proved their
value. These he believes constitute "the core or essence of democracy" and
as such represent "one of the creations of man that deserve to survive."
The major portion of the book is given to discussion and analysis of
"the four cornerstones of democracy," which, he feels, from the realistic
viewpoint, comprise certain procedures set up for the attainment of ends
which we deem desirable. These he describes as those (i) for the maintenance of individual liberties, (2) for the promotion of order and national
unity through mutual adjustment, (3) for the maintenance of powers by
which individuals may influence governmental action, and (4) for the
maintenance of the responsibility of industry to its employees and to the
people, and for the promotion of economic security.
Within the first category, individual liberties, the author discusses the
usual list of rights and immunities. He is not concerned over the fact that
our constitutions and laws, fostering and encouraging these fundamental
freedoms, result in a wide diversity in objectives, standards, and procedures
or that the general scene is one of confusion. He reasons that "things are
seldom what they seem on the surface. Even the ocean is calm beneath its
heaving billows." One could wish that others not likely at the outset to
hold the views of most of us in this country would read Professor Goble's
simply stated reasoning by which he arrives at the conclusion that freedom
for the masses, the majority and the minorities, "is justified not only because of its beneficial effect upon the individual, but also because freedom
furnishes the best means for the discovery of truth and for making ideas
available for use both to individuals and to society." Perhaps at points his
argument goes far: "If one is free to speak, he is forced to think." Maybe
all that is needed by students entering the law schools is greater freedom of
speech!
Many readers will find particularly interesting the author's discussion
of radio, the distinctions between it and the press with respect to "freedom," and the reasoning from which he concludes that "foolishly used, the
radio carries a threat of serious proportions to democratic institutions.
Wisely used, it may prove to be one of our most powerful instruments for
education in democracy."
(69o)
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Greater space is given to consideration of "Order and National Unity."
Here the author copes with the old problem-"these forces toward liberty
and toward unity are, to a degree, in opposition to each other." He makes
the point that the problem is not merely, as some contend, that of drawing
a line between liberty and authority. He admits the impossibility of drawing any hard and fast line between "liberties which, in a democracy, must
be held, inviolate and those which, in the interest of order and unity, are
subject to restriction by compromise, adjustment, or regulation." After
propounding the question how there can be unity in a democracy which protects and encourages differences and diversity in views and opinions, Professor Goble gives the only answers I believe exist. They are so simple to
state but apparently so difficult or at least slow in achievement. He makes
quite clear (what is too often not sufficiently appreciated) why democracy
does not necessarily mean that the will of the majority shall prevail.
Under the heading, "The Political Party and the Politician," Mr.
Goble makes pertinent observations concerning the operation of our and
other political party systems as well as the place of the "independent party
man," concluding that "the politician and the independent are so important
in a democracy that each ought to be charitable in his criticism of the other."
Proceeding next to "Revolution versus Evolution," the author contrasts
what has taken place in a number of countries of the world and the developments in Great Britain. "Whatever gains have been made for democracy
in seven hundred years of evolutionary development and growth are embodied in the Great Britain of today. Modern Britain and her people are
the product of the forces of democracy operating over these many years."
He concludes that Great Britain, with the collaboration of* America, has
developed a way of life and has set up a system of procedures-political,
legal, and economic-which offers the best hope yet devised by man for the
ultimate elimination of tyranny, oppression, and the exploitation of the
weak by the strong. He hastens to add: "It is not that the sins of either
England or America are to be condoned."
Two topics treated in the Chapter entitled "Individual Power-Responsibility in Government," will have particular interest to many readers.
In his discussion of "The Bureaucratic Process," Professor Goble manifests
a broad understanding in relation to the various objections that have been
raised to our bureaucratic system. Similarly effective is his dissertation
regarding the difference between law in a democracy and law in a fascist
state.
The fourth cornerstone of democracy is given as responsibility in industry and business. After tracing briefly the development of the private
corporation, the author points up the "new social problem" presented and
proceeds to inquire into its bearing upon democracy. In particular does he
discuss the validity of the arguments directed against the intervention of
the government in industrial affairs in behalf of labor. He undertakes to
support the proposition that "The National Labor Relations Act has done
more than any other single enactment to introduce democracy into the industrial organization."
While the book is concerned primarily with democracy in peacetime,
its scope is extended slightly in a short chapter, "Democracy, the War, and
the Peace." Throughout, the author makes clear that it has not been his
purpose "to advocate any social program or reform-to solve any of the
myriad problems with which we are confronted" but rather "to separate
the chaff from the wheat among the institutions and procedures we already
have, and to show that democracy has supplied us with highly effective tools

692

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95

for doing whatever we want to do, if we but have the courage and patience
to use them."
Professor Goble has done a good job in finding for himself and making available to others the answers to his questions and concerns after a
look at pre-war Europe. His discussion is simple, easy to follow and persuasive. The statement of the case for democracy is temperate and Wellbalanced. Both "conservatives" and liberals" will find much in it to applaud. Some may find in it "nothing particularly new," but in my opinion
the book is timely in this day of "conflicting ideologies" and to a law professor we, lawyers and laymen, are indebted for a dispassionate analysis of
the fundamental and worth conserving procedures best calculated to give
recognition to "the incomparable value and dignity of the human being."
Earl G. Harrisont

THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW. By Julius Stone. Sydney,
Australia. Associated General Publications Pty. Ltd. 1946. Pp.
lxiv, 918.
"In an age of rapidly extending social control through law, we
are still teaching, for the'most part, a jurisprudence which fitted the
needs of a laissez faire society. In an age when bitter disagreement
concerning human purposes and concerning the nature of society, permeates the whole field of law, we are still teaching a jurisprudence
based on an assumed general agreement or at least indifference in
these matters. In an age when man is constrained to bring disciplined
thought to bear upon the control of himself individually and in the
mass, we are still, for the most part, indulging the assumption that the
really significant question about the law is whether it can be viewed
as a logically self-contained system. In an age unrivalled for fluidity
and rapid change even in basic legal conceptions, we are still teaching
jurisprudence as if the law were static, capable of being dismantled and
restored at leisure. Or if we profess the purer analytical science, we
are seeking those logical verities, which must necessarily, insofar as
they claim absolute validity, be removed toto coelo from the urgencie'
of the age in which we live." (p. 42)
The appearance of this monumental work on jurisprudence introduces
order and system into a field shot through in the present century with as
diffuse, occasional and chaotic a literature as has ever burdened a subject
matter with pretensions to "science." The outstanding marks of The
Province and Function of Law by the distinguished Challis Professor of
Jurisprudence and International Law at the University of Sydney are clarity and orderliness of exposition on the one hand, and, on the other, meticulous attention to detail and complete, even labored, documentation of
source material and authorities.
The work begins with a general introduction entitled "The Province
of Jurisprudence Redetermined." Herein, the author first demonstrates
the "precipitating" character of his mind by proposing a simplified scheme
t Dean, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
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for classifying the methods of jurisprudence which discards such adventitious or nonce categories as historical jurisprudence, philosophical jurisprudence, general jurisprudence, particular jurisprudence, comparative
jurisprudence, and the like. The proposal is made that jurisprudence be
divided into three grand parts: Analytical Jurisprudence, Theory of Justice,
and Sociological or Functional Jurisprudence. The test of the adequacy
of this scheme is the book itself which is divided into three parts to correspond with this classification: Part I, Law and Logic; Part II, Law and
Justice; Part III, Law and Society. Not the least important aspect of this
classification is its eminent teachableness. The book is meant for "legal
scholars, practitioners, teachers, students."
Part I, then, deals with Law and Logic, and it is to this category that
Stone reduces the penetrating if somewhat discursive writings of the leaders
of analytical jurisprudence. The enduring worth of Austin, Roguin, Kelsen, Hobfeld, the "free scientific research" of Geny, and the interminable
paradoxes arising from the conflict of theories of stare decisis and progress
in the law, all are seen as efforts to lay bare the formal structure of law,
its logic, as distinguished from its two main material elements: justice and
society. This is indeed a bold stroke of simplification, or better still, of insight into what this confused body of jurisprudential materials really deals
with.
Viewed as attempts to reduce the body of law to self-consistent propositions, the work of the analytical jurists is relieved of the charge that it
fails to take account of vast areas of relevant legal data. The one-sidedness
of analytical jurisprudence becomes its virtue. These systems ignore what
they cannot and should not encompass, and the sole test of their adequacy
is that by which any formal system should be judged: internal self-consistency.
Austin and Hohfeld present no great difficulty when viewed as legal
logicians, or as we might say, formalists. Their systems are partial and
self-limited. Kelsen's, on the contrary, purports to be a scheme of universal applicability. Moreover, its prime elements, legal norms, are thought
of as devoid of all reference to justice or to social data. They are, in the
words of Kelsen, "pure" or a priori until they are determined, sociological
jurisprudence has no province (p. 105). Stone patiently follows the unfolding of this logical scheme until he comes to the basic norm, the one from
which all other norms are derived. For Stone, the Kelsenian claim that
the basic norm, for example, the constitution of a federal state, can be
selected and, let us say, understood without reference to the social milieu
out of which it arose is inconceivable. Stone does concede, however, that
once having obtained a basic norm (from its social or cultural setting)
subsidiary norms may be deduced from it in "pure" fashion, that is, without reference to theories of justice or to social data.
The reviewer must confess that he is quite at a loss to see how subordinate norms can be drawn from a basic norm without reference to nonlogical and "meta-legal" considerations. To begin with, no known jurisprudential system is adequate to stand as the formal basis for a system of
law; that is, a system of jurisprudence of such a character that granting its
formal presuppositions, subordinate propositions follow as theorems. That
much is certain. But, if this requirement of legal logic be passed over as
utopian, there remains for the subordinate norms precisely the same difficulty Stone was at such pains to reveal in the determination of the basic
norm. That is, how select among possible competing subordinate norms
save on the basis of sociological data, theories of legislation, theories of
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decision, what not? Moreover, how understand and apply the subordinate
norms even though their selection by a tour de force be granted?
In fact, it is the reviewer's conviction, which must here be merely
noted but not defended, that none of these analytical systems are logical
systems at all, and their parts hang together, if indeed they do, as apt characterizations of socio-legal relations and not as parts of logically consistent
schemes. They are incipient or inchoate forind systems of law, in aim akin
to the postulational or presuppositional frames of reference of the mathematical and physical sciences, and as such very precious to the legal methodologist, since in fact they represent the most successful and most adroit
attempts at formal structural analysis existing in the whole field of living
behavior including biology, psychology and all of the social sciences.
These formak legal structures use logic, as do non-formal systems of
thought. But they are not logic. Indeed, I think Professor Stone might
well agree that there is no such thing as "legal logic" (p. 17) or "logic of
the law" (p. 31). There are many and diverse applications of logic to the
law, only one of which is the application of logic to formal systems of law.
That the law has little to do with logic as the modern world treats that
discipline was well known to Professor Stone who expressly excepts from
consideration theories of the nature of logic not likely to be familiar to his
general reader (p. 137). In a word, although in theory he sticks to the
older logic of the syllogism, yet in practice effectively disposes of this vehicle of 'ratiocination by a thorough analysis of Fallacies (I should say Inadequacies) of the Logical Form in Legal Reasoning.
Part II tackles the relation of Law to Justice. This section encompasses most of what passes currently as Philosophical Jurisprudence or the
study of the ideal element of law. Stone refers these systems, heavily
charged as many of them are with philosophical currents, to the social situations out of which they arise and to the practical problems they are designed to solve. Law and justice is a very valuable contribution to the
"sociology of knowledge." Legal philosophical systems -are here handled
as social factors of the time and place. The chapter headings illustrate in
the main this point: Metaphysical Individualism (Kant) ; Individualist
Utilitarianism (Bentham) ; Social Utilitarianism (Jhering) ; Social
Idealism (Stammler) ; Neo-Hegelian Civilization (Kohler); Social Solidarism (Duguit) ; Pragmatism (Pound).
The chapter on Jeremy Bentham is a masterpiece. Here the British
author is completely at home and quite definitely on his own. The chapter
on Natural Law is an adequate historical sketch. Those on Social 'Utilitarianism, Neo-Hegelian Civiliz;ation and Social Solidarism are thorough
analyses by one sure of the material he handles, and sensitive to the humanitarian aspects of the projects these movements advance. The section or
Roscoe Pound is an objective and detached survey of the pragmatic foundations of Pound's work.
It is in the chapters on Kant and Stammler that Stone fails to hold the
pace. We may well let Kant go, as an old story many times told. But
Stammler is a different matter. Relying mainly on the Lehre von richtigen
Rechte Stone painstakingly follows Stammler's professed attempt to pass
from a prioriprinciples of universal law to positive rules for deciding cases
or enacting legislation. The task is to find the point at which Stammler
bridges the gap from heaven to earth, i. e., applies a principle having no
empirical content to a situation having only empirical content. Stammler
offers as a transition device a scheme known as the model of just law-a
device compounded of both a priori and empirical elements, a mixture of
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both heaven and earth, as it were. The notion is evidently borrowed from
the Schema of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason which serves the same purpose as the model of just law.
Professor Stone's actual criticisms of the Stammlerian system are twofold: first, the principles of just law are tautological. "It is necessary to
know what is arbitrary in order to know what is 'just'. But can we know
what is arbitrary unless we know what is just?" (p. 325) Second, Stammler
fails to bridge the gap beteen his a priori system of principles and the empirical conflict of claims. This second criticism is the one history has
most often levelled at Stammler's master, Kant. And it is one which remains unanswered unless one chooses to regard Kant's philosophical system (and Stammler's also) as formal structures in the sense discussed above in connection with analytical jurisprudence. If Kant's
efforts in the Critiques be viewed as methodology for science, and not (as
Kant himself thought) an account of how the whole learning process arises,
that is, if the Critiques be regarded as concerned with the problem of how
a scientific experimenter, not a mere experiencer, acquires knowledge,
then the a prioricharacter of his work (and that of Stammler as well) loses
its fantastic quality of make-believe and other worldliness and becomes
a formal frame of reference for science (and for law).
This viewpoint accepted, Stone's first criticism would likewise fall.
It is no objection that formal principles are tautological. Many of them
are mere definitions and therefore tautologies by nature. It is true some
tautologies are sterile, as would be the case if one were to say for example
that arbitrary conduct is unjust and unjustice is arbitrary conduct. But
this would merely be a slip or oversight in a formal scheme, easily corrected. It would not be a formal defect in the system.
Part III, Law and Society, comprises slightly more than half of the
text. Here is the test of Stone's work with the law in action, the mutual
interactions of society and law. Law and Society interpenetrate without
losing their identity: no aspect of law that is not suffused with the effects
of the social milieu; no society so rudimentary and none so complex that
law does not enter it as a prime factor of social control. In this Part,
orderly arrangement struggles to maintain itself against the social flood.
That Stone is able to keep his (analytical) head above water marks him
apart from most students of law and society. This part of the book is
really a godsend to the newcomer in the field of what is often loosely called
"Sociology of Law". That the struggle to maintain orderliness exacts its
price is not to be wondered at. In this catch-as-catch-can branch of the
law in the making, violence must be done some of the conflicting interests
clamoring for recognition and Stone sacrifices much less than most minds
with the strong analytical bent.
Part III is itself divided into three sections on a rough temporal
continuum of past, present and future: Law and Society in Retrospect;
Law in Modern Democratic Society; and Social, Economic and Psychological Factors in Legal Stability and Change. Law and Society in
Retrospect is an analysis of the material of historical jurisprudence against
the background of Law and National Development. This is a significant
departure from the ordinary treatment of historical jurisprudence as an
autonomous jurisprudential method without vital reference to the social
scene which gave it birth and shaped its development. This section is a
very important contribution to sociological history, transcending as it does
the lawyer's natural tendency to tie his study of history closely to the course
of development of purely legal institutions.
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Law in Modem Democratic Society is a well worked out study of
the Theory of Interests. It contains a concise account of the extent to
which law in modern western society, secures individual, social and economic interests. The analysis cuts across the ordinary legal compartments
such as torts, domestic relations, property, commercial transactions, and
economic interests such as taxation, labor law, workmen's compensation,
monopoly, and the like. The technique used is the familiar one of viewing law as a means for reconciling conflicting interests that press for recognition in modem democratic society. This section of the book is a thorough summary statement of the modern law in action. The law student
who would work through it should have a synoptic view of the law that
would serve to consolidate his piecemeal learning in the various segregated
branches of the law to which he has been more or less successfully exposed.
Part III of Part III is the most important section of the book. Here
Stone grapples with questions on the very frontiers of the law. The social
sciences set the problems to be examined. Familiarity with jurisprudential
theories is presumed throughout.
First is the question of the independent existence of state law. "The
starting point of all inquiries into the relation of the state-society and its
law, is the socially derivative and non-autonomous character of law and
its dependence upon environmental conditions .

.

.

"

(p. 649).

Does

state-society law enjoy an identity in some sense separate from the society
in which it exists? This question has been answered in the negative from
five main viewpoints: (i) Comte's mechanical sociology; (2) Spencer's
social evolutionism; (3) Marx's communism; (4) Duguit's social solidarism; and (5) philosophic anarchism. The inadequacies of these systems
which threaten to submerge law in the social flux are examined.
Thereafter (Chap. XXV) the socio-ethical pressures behind law observance or law violation are studied at length. The role of non-logical,
non-rational and emotional social-psychological factors take up much of
the ground formerly occupied by natural law, morality, and conscience as
determinants of the ideal element in law or, as it is sometimes put, theories
of justice. Weber, Veblen, Pareto, Ehrlich and Timashiff figure largely
in this discussion.
The next chapter is entitled Power and the Complexity of Law. This
is an extended study of the effect of moidem theories of power psychology
on law. This contrast between naked power (force) and socially accepted
political power relations places in a modern scientific setting the familiar
concepts of sovereignty, social contract, bureaucracy, collectivism and
totalitarianism on the political level, and the notions of laissez faire, competition, monopoly, cartels, labor and management on the economic level.
The legal bases of revolution are studied in terms of power. This section
raises the discussion of these subjects in their relation to law far above the
level ordinarily encountered in juridic writings in this country or in
England. The modern collectivist society is accepted as a fait accompli
and the question of return to the outmoded "power relations" of the nineteenth century is not deemed to be seriously proposed.
The last chapter covers the subject of Law and Social Control. It
raises the critical issue whether law can establish itself as the ultimate
means whereby society regulates all other methods of internal control, i. e.,
whether law may properly be viewed as the "control of controls". If so,
the next question is: what controls the controller, that is, what ends or
aims can be agreed upon as limiting, or rather as directing, law in the fulfillment of its task? If no general agreement can be arrived at concerning
the ultimate purposes of law then presumably law serves some special inter-
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est or interests. This is the legal relativist's chief dilemma. Stone attempts a preliminary solution of it by means of a minimum program for the
humane conduct of government in modem democratic society. He leaves
open the problem of how these minimum standards may be raised by the
extension of a system of social control through law consistent with
democracy.
So much for a running account of the book and its contents. The
over-all impression left with the reviewer is that this book might well close
an epoch (or at least a sub-division of an epoch) in modern jurisprudence.
Its first tvo parts contain a fair and accurate summary of jurisprudential
writings from Austin to the second quarter of the present century. The
remainder of the book opens up the wide vistas of law in the social sciences. Hereafter, however much modem curricula of law schools may
lag behind 'even nineteenth century jurisprudence, legal scholarship, at
least, has no further excuse for dealing exclusively in the minutiae of the
law and abdicating to non-legally trained experts in the social disciplines
the task of keeping at razor's edge the "subtle mind of the law."
Analytical jurisprudence, the typically Anglo-American contribution
to the basic study of the law, is seen as merely one part of that study,
namely, its formal part. Law and Society, or better still law and social
science, is looked upon as the important area of legal development for the
present 'and the future. It is hard to believe that academic separation of
law and the social sciences which still is well nigh universal in this country
can long endure. It is time that we got on with the task of integrating
law and the social sciences. Stone's book shows how little we have accomplished in performing this task and how much more remains to be done.
THOMAS A. COWAN t

THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION.

By Kenneth S. Carlston.

New York: Columbia University Press. 1946. Pp. xiv, 318.
In this monograph on certain procedural problems of international
arbitration, which he regards as "a judicial process, involving the settlement of disputes between States by tribunals acting as courts of law," Professor Carlston states that "study of the international court itself is as important as that of the law laid down by the court."
The scope of this book is somewhat narrower than the title suggests.
It does not describe at length international arbitral tribunals or their operating procedures. Its primary concern is with cases in which something
goes wrong in the course of an arbitration, rather than with the normal and
successful functioning of arbitral tribunals. This emphasis on the failures
-which most certainly call for study and for improvement-should not
create the impression that such failures are the usual result of submission
to international arbitration. Indeed, the reviewer wishes that the author
had discussed at greater length those procedural developments which may
help to bring about a more speedy and less expensive, yet adequate, consideration of international legal controversies. Professor Carlston's comments on the use of "administrative decisions" by the German-American
Mixed Claims Commission to cover groups of cases presenting common
j Professor of jurisprudence, University of Nebraska College of Law.

698

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95

problems, the employment of agreed statements of facts, and rejection by
Agents of claims wherein it is clear that awards cannot be obtained, all
make us wish that he had expanded his treatment of improvements in the
actual procedure of arbitral tribunals.
The first chapter of the book is devoted to the function and importance
of procedural rules, their adaptation to the arbitration in question, and the
need for care in the preparation of the compromis (the agreement between
the two Governments providing for the arbitration-not to be confused with
"compromise"!).
The author points to the dangers in blindly adopting
rules framed for dissimilar arbitrations, and doubts the feasibility of any
general codification of international arbitral procedure rules. He urges
that the parties incorporate detailed rules of procedure in the compromis,
and vest in the tribunal power to amend these rules when found necessary.
The next chapter deals with "Minimum Procedural Standards." Conformity to the compromis is the primary requisite. The rest is summarized
as follows: "The parties are entitled to a decision emanating from the tribunal designated by them in the compromis, in its capacity as a tribunal,
not as the personal opinions of its members, joined in by a majority of the
arbitrators, rendered after due and joint deliberation, and supported by
reason. All these conditions are essential to the validity of the tribunal's
decision."
The keynote of the lengthy chapter on "Jurisdiction" is that an arbitral tribunal "must ever endeavor in good faith to keep within the limits of
its treaty, and its decisions will have validity only insofar as it keeps within
its jurisdiction, express or implied." 1 This is the heart of the whole volume. The author discusses the effects of an arbitration under a compromis
which is invalid or in excess of the constitutional limitations of one party,
the power of an arbitral tribunal to decide the question of its own jurisdiction, 2 and problems relating to departure from the terms of submission.
Cases considered in full detail include decisions upon issues regarded as
not within the scope of the compromis, decisions affecting the rights of third
States not before the tribunal, failure to apply a rule for decision laid
down in the compromis,3 and the improper invocation of "equity" or the
resort to the arbitrator's subjective views of right.
In discussing "essential error," Professor Carlston concludes that:
"The ramification of the views of writers as to the meaning of essential
error demonstrates the looseness, vagueness, and lack of legal exactness of
the term. . . . It is a conclusion based upon other and preceding legal
steps in the analysis of an award, steps embracing questions such as aspects
of departure from terms of submission, express or implied, and failure to
apply applicable rules of international law. When the arbitral award is
lacking in one or more of the conditions required for its validity, as established by the practice of States, the tribunal may be said to have committed
an essential error."
Ensuing chapters deal with "Finality of the Award", "Rehearing",
and "Appeal." The author explains that, although by "entering into the
arbitration agreement and participating in the proceedings before the tribunal, the parties impliedly engage to execute the award when rendered,"
i. Page 62. It is admitted, however, that "by their conduct the parties can by tacit
consent enlarge the powers of the tribunal." (Page 170.)
2. "Unquestionably firmly established as a principle of international arbitral law"
(page 74).
3. Or "an applicable rule of international law having a material bearing tipon the
outcome of the case" (page i4o).
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international law "permits States to disregard the awards of arbitrators
when rendered under certain conditions," which he has discussed. Such
arbitral awards have at times been the subject of rehearing or revision. The
author urges that "means should be established whereby claims of nullity
of awards can be judicially determined," and suggests that review might
well be by the International Court of Justice, 4 pursuant to specific grant of
authority.
Professor Carlston regards international arbitration as "an infinitely
flexible process," saying that "The form of the tribunal and the type of the
procedure can always be adjusted to the complexity and volume of the litigation to be submitted for decision." He adds that "Not all international
controversies are important enough to justify the weighty and expensive
procedures of the International Court of Justice," and recommends that
"International claims based on injuries to citizens, for example, can still
best be handled by special tribunals." It is regretted that these points are
not amplified, with fuller comparison of international arbitral procedure
with that of the International Court of Justice.5 The wide-spread interest
in commercial and civil arbitration as a substitute for litigation in our domestic legal system might well encourage further investigation as to what
advantages arbitration may have over adjudication in the international field,
where both are regarded as judicial processes.
Some may question the author's emphasis or differ with certain of his
conclusions. However, there should be no disagreement with his plea that
international arbitral decisions be more widely published and translated,
and made more readily accessible through digests and indexes. The documentation of the Permanent Court of International Justice was excellent,
and the decisions of some arbitral tribunals have been adequately presented
to the world. Nevertheless, despite such compilations as Moore's Arbitrations,6 or the Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases7 much
work must be done before international arbitral decisions become available
to the government official, the practitioner or the scholar in a manner at all
comparable to the output of American courts. Steps in that direction"
would form a real contribution towards the "progressive development of
international law." 9
Win. W. Bishop, Jr.t
4. Page 245. He refers to the limited extent to which the Permanent Court of
International Justice has already functioned as an appellate tribunal.
5. The distinction between arbitration and adjudication receives little attention
in this book, while the procedure of the International Court of Justice or its predecessor is not discussed at length. One may therefore question the appropriateness of
the Appendix giving a comparative analysis of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice with that of the Permanent Court of International Justice.

6. J. B. MooRE, HisrolY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO
WHICH THE JNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY (Washington, 1898).
7. Edited by Dr. H. Lauterpacht and others, and covering the period since I918.
8. As one possibility, Professor Carlston suggests the registration of arbitral
awards with the United Nations, in the same fashion as treaties are registered.
9. U. N. CHARTER, Art. I3, I (a).
"Visiting Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
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